



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

### **ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL**

by

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December 2006

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**ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) was established to assist, determine, monitor, and track the fulfillment of Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWN's). This thesis has a primary goal to investigate whether the JRAC and its processes are value added to the DoD acquisition process, and a secondary goal to document the JRAC process and analyze its usage to date. Analysis such as this thesis may be used to determine if the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell is the correct model for rapid acquisition and if it should be institutionalized for the Global War on Terror and beyond.

The thesis assesses the JRACs value against a base line of existing service rapid acquisition processes. Value centers derived from Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodologies form the basis of the assessment. The thesis concludes with recommendations for JRAC institutionalization.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

*If you can go through the OODA loop faster than your enemy, you'll live and he'll die.*

*-John Boyd*

*While we are postponing, life speeds on.*

*-Seneca*

In this day of asymmetrical warfare and the rapid transfer of technology and communications, the speed required to complete the action/reaction cycle is increasing exponentially. One must have the ability to rapidly “observe–orient–decide–act” (OODA Loop)<sup>1</sup>—a maxim echoed throughout nearly all areas of the Department of Defense (DoD) and especially by the warfighter.

The United States military services have done an incredible job realigning the operational forces into an agile and highly flexible force that has demonstrated its ability to meet myriad threats. With this realignment in mind, the Department of Defense (DoD) must determine if the entire organization is aligned with its emphasis on maneuver warfare (speed and agility). This alignment should be incorporated throughout the organization—not simply at the warfighter level.

As the Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg stated, “the front office can only be as agile as the back office.” This metaphor symbolically calls for all service-supporting programs within the DoD to emphasize speed and agility in their processes, so they can truly be a support and not a hindrance to the warfighter.<sup>2</sup> An effective information-age system must

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<sup>1</sup> John R. Boyd, Colonel (Retired), United States Air Force, originated the OODA Loop concept—which is a cornerstone in today’s military strategy of maneuver warfare and how the warfighter is trained. His concept is outlined in his paper Destruction and Creation, 3 September 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kenneth J. Krieg, Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Remarks at the Naval Post Graduate School Acquisition Research Symposium (Monterey, CA: NPS, 19 May 2006).

focus on the outside world and “move to the sound of the guns.”<sup>3</sup> This need for speed and agility cannot come at the sacrifice of quality. Just as the Toyota Corporation has been able to meet its customers’ needs and wants quickly and with high levels of satisfaction, so must the DoD for its customer the warfighter.<sup>4</sup> As Peter Drucker states, “effective leaders realize that all the important impacts occur outside the organization and the organization exists for the purpose of achievements measured only by outside occurrences.”<sup>5</sup>

One of the ways the DoD has attempted to realign its acquisition community and the support it provides to the warfighter is through the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). The JRAC was born out of the need to rapidly acquire material or service solutions that, if not fulfilled, could result in the death of US service personnel or in mission failure.

## **B. GOALS**

The goal of this thesis is to investigate whether the JRAC and its processes are value added to the DoD acquisition process.

In order to accomplish the above, the discussion will also focus on a secondary goal: to document the JRAC process and analyze the usage of its processes to date.

## **C. METHODOLOGY**

A baseline will be established to determine if the JRAC is value added to the DoD acquisition system. This baseline will be drawn from existing DoD acquisition and Service rapid acquisition initiatives to highlight what existed prior to and in conjunction with the JRAC process. The baseline will use value centers to focus on those areas of importance to the DoD. A review of work done by Thomas Housel and Arthur Bell on

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<sup>3</sup> Newt Gingrich, *Entrepreneurialism and The Federal Government*, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, House Government Reform Committee, Federal Workforce and Agency Organization Subcommittee (Washington, DC, 13 July 2005).

<sup>4</sup> Chet Richards, *Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business* (Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Peter F. Drucker, *The Effective Executive* (New York: Harper Business Essentials, 2002).



the Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory was utilized to formulate these value centers.<sup>6</sup> The KVA methodology asserts that processes within an organization should add value to the final product, and that variations in these processes are transformational and can be valued in the final product.<sup>7</sup> These value centers are important to any organization in that they highlight those steps that add value to the final product, not those which merely waste resources. Information used to establish the baseline and to document the JRAC process will be qualitative and drawn from literature review, historical records examination, a case study, and interviews.

Analysis of usage of the JRAC process will be accomplished through statistical analysis as well as through historical data, documents, and interviews.

#### **D. ASSUMPTIONS**

This research makes some assumptions. The first is that the DoD must accelerate its acquisition time cycle to remain at a competitive military advantage in the next century given the evolutionary nature of war. The researcher also assumes that rapid acquisition does not necessarily result in inferior products or more costly solutions. Finally, it is assumed that there will need to be two forms of acquisition within the DoD for the future: one focused on long-term acquisition and one focused on short-term. The DoD can no longer simply categorize acquisitions in terms of dollars and technological readiness. It must consider a third, and quite possibly the most important, facet of time as a determinant of an acquisition's validity, supportability, and resourcing priority.

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<sup>6</sup> Thomas J. Housel and Arthur H. Bell, *Measuring and Managing Knowledge* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Thomas J. Housel and Arthur H. Bell, *Measuring and Managing Knowledge* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001).

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## **II. BACKGROUND**

### **A. ACQUISITION AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

Since September 11, 2001, the United States military has found itself involved in the Global War on Terror. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the military has been deployed and engaging the enemy all over the world. The Department of Defense went to war with the forces and equipment it had, but is rapidly employing a multitude of emerging technologies as the nature of war evolves.

In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), many new enemies have surfaced, and a variety of tactics have found their infancy in the alley ways of Iraq, the mountains of Kabul, and the fields in the Horn of Africa. As in any war, new tactics and enemies have given rise to a new breed of equipment and material to combat these efforts. The need for the standard beans, bullets, and band-aids still exists; but, as times change, so do many of the tools used in war.

Correspondingly, when the Department of Defense identifies a threat that can be countered or defeated through the procurement of a service or piece of equipment, the Department needs a process in place to get that equipment or service to the warfighter quickly. The ability to discover, develop, and deliver resources and materiel that can combat even the smallest of the terrorists' tactical advantages will be critical for victory.

### **B. THE MOVE TO RAPID ACQUISITION**

In wartime, delay in making decisions does not avoid risk; it can simply shift the risk to those who are already in danger.

-Paul Wolfowitz

In 2004, the Department of Defense, the Services, and members of Congress realized that procedures and processes had to be implemented in order to keep pace with the demands of a face-paced war. Within the acquisition regulations that existed at the time, there were many authorities that allowed the acquisition of materiel in a streamlined manner. Avenues such as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) purchasing and Service

rapid acquisition initiatives such as the Marine Corps's Universal Needs Statement (UNS), Navy's Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), and Air Force's Combat Mission Need Statement (C-MNS) were available to enable a faster acquisition process.<sup>8,9</sup> These formed the emerging baseline of rapid acquisition.

Problems still existed though; many institutional myths and long-entrenched business-as-usual practices continued to obstruct and slow many routes to procurement. Also, the lack of knowledge of existing procedures, the loss of institutional expertise due to retirement of long-term acquisition professionals, or the lack of continuity in acquisition staffs are causes of a slower acquisition process. There is a personnel-rotation policy through the Pentagon and Service acquisition staffs that have military personnel departing to their next duty assignment when they are just beginning to comprehend the system. There is also speculation that no one would dare move rapidly for fear of crossing a line, no matter how good the intention. This fear of being drawn and quartered for an error in bureaucratic process, either real or imagined, slows the process and limits the use of existing authorities.<sup>10</sup>

With these factors in mind, the Services, DoD, and Congress moved to broaden and implement new authorities to permit rapid acquisition, especially for equipment necessary to prevent the loss of life or mission failure.

## **1. Service Rapid Acquisition: A Baseline**

As mentioned earlier, within the DoD there are Service rapid acquisition processes (SRAP) in place. SRAP such as the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) have been put in place to expedite the acquisition of a capability to meet an urgent requirement. The Service processes outlined here exhibit similar efforts to meet materiel requests coming from the battlefield. Existing regulations allowed the

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<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, *The Defense Acquisition System*, 12 May 2003, Department of Defense Directive 5000.1.

<sup>9</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>10</sup> Jack D. Patterson, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), interview by author (Washington, DC), 8 September 2006.

following processes to take place, but were limited in scope to the specific Service and materiel that was deemed Service-specific. This overview will provide a baseline of rapid acquisition at the Service level within the DoD so a comparison can be made to the value offered by the JRAC.

***a. United States Marine Corps Rapid Acquisition***

The first process examined is the Marine Corps' UUNS process. This process is not intended to field equipment Marine Corps wide, but to fill immediate operational needs of deployed forces or those getting ready to deploy.<sup>11</sup> The capabilities fielded through the UUNS process will not normally be supported in the same manner as formal programs of record. The requests for UUNS solutions flow from the applicable Commander Marine Forces and Marine Component Commanders with general officer endorsement. Formatting of the requests is standardized and transmitted electronically. There is great emphasis in the process to forward, for information, UUNS requests to applicable Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and other Marine forces that are currently or will be operating in the same area that originates an UUNS to gauge if there is a greater need.<sup>12, 13</sup>

The Marine Corps' acquisition system puts these requests through a series of checks to validate, research, and fulfill the requests. Representatives from the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC), Deputy Commandant Programs & Resources (DC P&R), and the Deputy Commandant Combat Development & Integration (DC CD&I) are designated to handle an UUNS. These are the action organizations within the Marine Corps that validate and resolve submitted requests and distribute those items requested to the Marine warfighter.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> US Marine Corps, *Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) Process*, Washington, DC, 26 January 2006, MARADMIN 045/06.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> US Marine Corps, *OIF III Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) Process*, Washington, DC, 28 September 2004, MARADMIN 424/04.

<sup>14</sup> US Marine Corps, *Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) Process*, Washington, DC, 26 January 2006, MARADMIN 045/06.

The Marine Corps also incorporates the tracking of costs, usage rates, on-hand quantity, and the flow of fielded materiel from UUNS requests. Those UUNS requests that are unfilled are tracked and reported on a monthly basis, so requested needs are each fulfilled as soon as possible.

***b. United States Navy Rapid Acquisition***

The next Service rapid acquisition process to be examined is the Navy Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC). The Navy process provides the ability to react immediately to newly discovered or potential enemy threats or to respond to significant and urgent safety situations.<sup>15</sup> The RDC stresses streamlining of the dialogue between the requirements community, the Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), and the acquisition management community.<sup>16</sup> The RDC process is initiated at the program-sponsor level, and then validated by the Chief of Naval Operations (N8) for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments or by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) in the form of a memorandum. There is no standardized formatting for the request. The request is then forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)). The ASN (RD&A) then approves or disapproves the request; if it is approved, he/she will forward it onto the appropriate Program Executive Officer (PEO), Systems Command (SYSCOM), or Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM). These entities are then charged with developing strategy to expedite: resolution of the RDC, a plan of action, transition to an ACAT program if necessary, long-term maintenance, oversight, and testing of the solution.

The researcher found no reference to funding limitations, funding sources, or time limits established within the process.

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<sup>15</sup> US Navy, *Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Washington, DC, 19 November 2004, SECNAV Instruction 5000.2.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

*c. United States Army Rapid Acquisition*

The Army also has a rapid acquisition process in the form of the Rapid Equipping Force (REF). The REF is a unit unto itself that is located under the larger Army acquisition organization but is permanently staffed to handle only rapid acquisitions. The REF reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army and takes its guidance from the Army G-3 (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (ODCSOPS)). The REF's mission is to rapidly increase mission capability while reducing risk to soldiers and others.<sup>17</sup> Requests for REF solutions emanate both from the battlefield and also from REF personnel in the field who are attempting to solve identified problems with quick solutions on the battlefield and in operational test environments.<sup>18</sup> This circumstance is different from the other Services, since REF personnel are on the battlefield actively looking for capability gaps and solutions instead of waiting for requests to be forwarded up the chain of command. For requests with costs less than \$100,000, a simple needs statement is all that is required to initiate action by the REF team, and there is no predetermined format. Above the \$100,000 mark, a formatted Operational Needs Statement (ONS), validated by the appropriate official, is required. The REF is available to assist in drafting either request.

The REF has structured itself to assist in: (1) Direct Projects that are funded and controlled by REF personnel, (2) Franchise Projects that assist current or emerging programs to procure funding and work with commercial-based solutions that are currently available, or (3) Matrix Projects that assist in finding solutions to requests by merging existing materiel and technologies from other organizations (within the Army and DoD). Through these three structures, the REF has a stated goal of providing equipment solutions within 90 days and distributing products to the warfighter within 360 days. REF also maintains vigilance over materiel solutions fielded through the process for maintenance issues. Funding sources for REF initiatives vary.

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<sup>17</sup> US Army, Rapid Equipping Force Website. Available from <http://www.ref.army.mil/flash/default.html>; accessed 14 November 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

***d. United States Air Force Rapid Acquisition***

The Air Force also maintains its own in-house rapid acquisition process in the form of the Rapid Response Process (RRP), also referred to as Combat Capability Documents (CCD) and formerly known as Combat Mission Needs Statements (CMNS). This process has the stated purpose of accelerating the fielding of critical systems to meet theater-specific wartime needs.<sup>19</sup> The Aeronautical Systems Command Contingency Review Council (ASC CRC) handles requests that are generated from informal and formal notification of an urgent need emanating from a Major Command (MAJCOM) or an ASC Systems Wing or Group. There is no standardized format for the requests, and they must be deemed urgent by the ASC/CC (Commander, Aeronautical Systems Command). The ASC/CC can: (1) direct the issue to a specific Systems Wing or Direct Reporting Group, which is the normal acquisition channel, (2) request additional assistance or support, or (3) activate the ASC CRC specifically for a request. As the most rapid format, the ASC CRC takes the lead to rapidly focus the Air Force or its Systems Command on a specific crisis or need.<sup>20</sup> The ASC CRC's goal is to expedite communication and problem solving. Its members are designated to identify solutions, allocate ASC resources as authorized, ensure validated requests have appropriate Combat Capability Documents (CCD), and designate Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) or Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR). This acquisition means is not bound by rigid timelines nor does it have monetary limits associated with its procedures. Communication, along with vertical and horizontal coordination, is stressed throughout the process.

***e. United States Special Operations Command Rapid Acquisition***

Finally, one of the Combatant Commands has a rapid acquisition policy in place. As the only Combatant Command with its own inherent acquisition authority, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has developed its C-MNS

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<sup>19</sup> US Air Force, *Aeronautical Systems Center Rapid Response Process*, Aeronautical Systems Center Instruction 63-114, 13 October 2004.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.



(Combat Mission Needs Statement) to fill those gaps that require a rapid-acquisition solution. Requests are formulated by the various special operations teams and are then forwarded to the Center for Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic Assessments at USSOCOM. The requests are handled within this organization by the Requirements Directorate and Acquisition Center and are validated only when a compelling need is identified by a special operations force (SOF) during an active combat/contingency operation.<sup>21</sup> There is no standardized format for the submission of a request, and speed in providing the solution is stressed throughout the process. Most capabilities are delivered in six months or less. Possible funding sources for fulfilling a C-MNS include execution reviews, CMNS funds, supplemental requests, and Chairman Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) programs.<sup>22</sup>

*f. Service Rapid Acquisition Summary*

By the fall of 2004, all Services and one Combatant Command established processes to handle requests dealing with the emerging situation on the battlefield. Requests were being received from action in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas that required immediate resolution due to capability gaps that were putting service member lives and mission success at risk.

These processes were put in place to add value to the existing Service acquisition processes and to handle situations that were occurring at the time. The SRA processes had to focus on quickly distributing products to the warfighter in each Service while still operating within the existing Service acquisition framework. These SRAP coincide with many of the JRAC's same value centers.

Many of the Service rapid acquisition systems are limited to existing Service budgets and affect only that Service's materiel portfolio. These Service

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<sup>21</sup> Brigadier General Alfred Flowers, Director USSOCOM Center for Force Structure, Requirements, Resources and Strategic Assessments, interview with Special Operations Technology Online Edition, <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1500> , accessed 13 November 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Brigadier General Alfred Flowers, Director USSOCOM Center for Force Structure, Requirements, Resources and Strategic Assessments, interview with Special Operations Technology Online Edition, <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1500> , accessed 13 November 2006.

initiatives allow increased flexibility and are managed by existing acquisition staffs that are implementing existing Service acquisition strategies. The Services also manage the long-term rapid acquisition of the materiel and may incorporate it more fully where feedback dictates.

An understanding of the Service's RA background and processes is vital to this discussion if we are to truly understand the JRAC process and its beginnings.

## **2. Rapid Acquisition Authority Legislation**

Two pieces of important legislation have direct implications to current DoD rapid acquisition authority: the *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005* (House Resolution 4200) and the *Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003*. Within Section 811 of H.R. 4200 (which was signed into law by the President on 28 October 2004), the Congress provided authority for the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to rapidly acquire and deploy such equipment as approved by his signature in order to eliminate a combat-capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.<sup>23</sup>

There are some key provisions within section 806(c) of the *Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003* (Public Law Number 107-314) and section 811 of the *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005* (Public Law Number 108-375) that are important to note. Within these two sections, the SecDef, after making the determination that a materiel deficiency exists, shall designate a senior official to acquire the needed equipment with a goal of contract award within 15 days. This designated senior official is also authorized to waive any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation that would unnecessarily impede such acquisition, with the caveat that such impediment is submitted in writing and that any waiver is in no way contrary to any provision of law imposing civil or criminal penalties.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> US House, *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*, HR 4200, Section 811, Pub. L. No. 108-375.

<sup>24</sup> US Congress, *Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003*, 2 December 2002, Section 806, Pub. L. No. 107-314.

The bill also limits any acquisition under this authority to no more than \$100 million during any fiscal year and requires the SecDef to notify Congressional Defense Committees within 15 days if such action is deemed necessary.<sup>25</sup> Congress also, under this legislation, permits broad financing avenues, allowing the SecDef to utilize any funds available to DoD within that fiscal year in order to fund the acquisition. There is a two-year time limit associated with any program that requires such rapid acquisition authority transition to the normal acquisition system after the initial determination by the SecDef. The Congress further stipulated, in Section 806 of the bill, that the SecDef shall ensure a streamlined process between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acquisition community, the research and development community, and the commander of the combatant commands (COCOMs).<sup>26</sup>

### **3. The Birth of the JRAC**

Prior to the President's signature to the bill, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz (DepSecDef), on 3 September 2004, sent a memorandum establishing the formation of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC).<sup>27</sup> Figure 1 depicts the sequence of legislation and correspondence leading up to the establishment of the JRAC and subsequent actions taken upon its implementation.

Various memoranda emanated from the SecDef's and DepSecDef's offices during the fall of 2004 which laid the ground work for how the JRAC would operate. They assigned personnel, organizational structure, procedures, composition, roles and responsibilities of offices involved, and a timeline for the program's existence.

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<sup>25</sup> US House, *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*, 2005, HR 4200, Section 811, Pub. L. No. 108-375.

<sup>26</sup> US House, *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*, 2005, HR 4200, Section 811, Pub. L. No. 108-375.

<sup>27</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum, Subject: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC)*, 3 September 2004.

DepSecDef Wolfowitz's memorandum of 15 November 2004 established the procedures for the JRAC and the need for the creation of such a process in order to meet the urgent needs of combatant commands determined to be operationally critical.<sup>28</sup>

The action memorandum of 20 December 2004 was a recommendation the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) be designated as the gatekeeper for all requests needing the SecDef's written determination for acquisitions under the provision for rapid acquisition authority. It also stated that the JRAC would be employed to fulfill such requests. This recommendation was subsequently approved and placed the JRAC under the office of the USD (AT&L).<sup>29</sup>

On January 25, 2005, SecDef Rumsfeld sent a memorandum to senior defense officials instructing the Department on how requests for rapid acquisition would be fulfilled. This memorandum also acknowledged the urgency to rapidly fulfill the operational needs of the warfighter.<sup>30</sup>

The memorandum of DepSecDef Wolfowitz on 22 March 2005 reinforced the time-critical nature of rapid acquisition and the pace of internal processes within the Pentagon. The memorandum outlined the DepSecDef's concerns in regards to time-critical actions to meet the needs of the warfighter and how he felt that staff work, mirroring in administrative processes and delays to avoid risk, was unacceptable.<sup>31</sup>

By July 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had produced Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01 (CJCSI 3470.01), titled *The Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution*. This instruction formalized policy for the integration between the Joint Staff and the already formed Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. The instruction stated that the Joint Staff would act as the "gatekeeper" for current JUONs and any JUONs further designated

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<sup>28</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, Subject: Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs), 15 November 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), *Action Memorandum, Subject: Fiscal Year 2005 Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA)*, 20 December 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum, Subject: Fiscal Year 2005 Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA)*, 25 January 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum, Subject: Time Critical Actions*, 22 March 2005.

as Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs) emanating from the various combatant commands.<sup>32</sup> The instruction further designated the JRAC as the lead organization in resolving validated IWNs. It specified that such requests would need to be joint in nature, outside of normal DoD 5000 acquisition processes, and not intended to compete with existing Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Special Operations Command) rapid fielding processes. This final linkage of the Joint Staff with the JRAC leads us into the organizational structure of the JRAC.

#### **4. JRAC Structure**

The outline in Figure 2 below shows the individuals and offices involved in the JRAC process. The actual composite of individuals dealing with a particular Immediate Warfighter Need may vary and will be discussed later.

As the diagram indicates, the JRAC core group is made up of a team of senior-level civilian and military personnel who meet as the situation dictates to discuss those JUONs/IWNs requiring action.<sup>33</sup>

The team members and advisory group members are in a position to make action decisions. They are not merely place-holders or information-gatherers who attend sessions to relay it to other decision-makers. These team members are able to observe-orient-decide-act (OODA Loop) in an expeditious manner.<sup>34</sup>

It is important to note that the structure of the advisory group and its input into actions taken on JUONs/IWNs is limited and tailored specifically to the request being processed. This policy limits the need to call all members from the advisory group to every meeting to discuss all JUONs and IWNs, which would inherently slow down the process. This structure was put in place to insure speed in the decision cycle by not involving those members who are neither affected by nor needed for resolution to the

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<sup>32</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>33</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum, Subject: Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs)*, 15 November 2004.


<sup>34</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, interview by author (Washington, DC), 7 September 2006.

issue. When a member of the advisory group does have direct input into the matter, then he/she is incorporated into the process for that particular JUON/IWN.<sup>35</sup>

For example, for a JUON involving a ground-operating system, members from the Army, Marine Corps, and SOCOM might be incorporated into the advisory group due to their possible involvement in and employment of the system. The operators, maintainers, and/or funding sources from these Services may also be involved and would have relevant input into advisory group discussions.

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<sup>35</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, interview by author (Washington, DC), 7 September 2006.



**Figure 1. Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Legislation and Correspondence Timeline**

### C. THE JRAC PROCESS

A good plan executed today is better than a perfect plan executed at some indefinite point in the future.

-General George Patton Jr.

Since the customer is the focus for products coming out of the JRAC, we turn to that customer to understand how the process begins. Currently, somewhere in Iraq or Afghanistan, soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines are in contact with the enemy. Given

their proximity, they may be the best judges as to what is effective and necessary to be successful at achieving their mission and US national security goals. Also, they are the ones who have to use the products coming out of the Pentagon's acquisition processes, and many times they have some very strong opinions as to what they should be using or what may work better. The practitioner may know best what works.

This is relevant in the Global War on Terror, and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) are fielding a wide variety of requests from their troops for products and services they believe are solutions to capability gaps they see as they are fighting the war. This process for requesting solutions varies from COCOM to COCOM and is producing a wide variety of suggestions.

What occurs next is that these requests eventually make it to the first general officer in the chain-of-command in the form of an Urgent Operational Need (UON). That first general officer will then review such requests and either validate or not validate the proposal.<sup>36</sup>

In some cases, these suggestions may be Service-specific: for example, a new type of patrol boat to be launched from an AEGIS naval ship. This would automatically relegate that suggestion to move along a Service-specific process, in this case involving the Navy.

If such a request is validated and is deemed urgent, the Services have processes in place to rapidly field such a product, as mentioned earlier. The validation from the general officer would be sufficient to begin processing a UON through the individual Service's format. If it is not Service-specific or unable to be fulfilled by a Service, then the general officer recommendation may move up to the Combatant Commander for validation and resolution.

The Combatant Commanders may field suggestions that sometimes have implications that overlap Service-specific missions. For such joint suggestions, the COCOM may decide to validate and submit the suggestion in the form of a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON).

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<sup>36</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).



The JUON serves the COCOM by allowing him to spotlight a gap in his capabilities that the Services, who are chartered to train and equip the forces the COCOM employs, do not possess. This JUON is a prioritized operational need that requires a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) solution. If this need is not satisfied, lives could be lost, and missions could be jeopardized.<sup>37</sup> The JUON also assists the COCOM in finding a material solution if a solution cannot be satisfied through an existing Service process. Some have termed this process and ability to procure materiel solutions as the “COCOM’s acquisition process.”

Once the COCOM has identified, validated, and submitted a JUON, both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director for Force Structure Resources and Assessment (J8) and the JRAC receive the request.<sup>38</sup> As the gatekeeper of the JRAC process, the J8 Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition (DDRA) and the office’s designated Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) will immediately review and validate/recommend the request for action as a JUON or possibly an Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN).<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> JRAC, *Brief: AT&L Offsite Shaping the Enterprise*, 7 September 2006.

<sup>38</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

## JRAC CORE GROUP

- Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L)
- USD Comptroller (USD(C))
- Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy (DPAP)
- General Counsel
- Joint Staff
- Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF)

## JRAC ADVISORY GROUP<sup>1</sup>

- Other AT&L Offices
- Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)
- National Assessment Group
- Combatant Commands (COCOMs)
- Army
- Navy
- Air Force
- Marines
- Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

Army Rapid Equipping  
Forces/Operational Needs  
Statement

Navy Capability Rapid  
Deployments

USAF Combat Mission  
Needs Statement

SOCOM Combat Mission  
Needs Statement

USMC Urgent Universal  
Needs Statements

<sup>1</sup>All COCOMS and Military Services are represented on the JRAC. The JRAC assists the Military Services' rapid equipping initiatives upon request or upon identification of an Immediate Warfighting Need (IWN).

**Figure 2. Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Core and Advisory Groups<sup>40</sup>**

At this point in the process, the designated FCB will take the lead in “triaging” the JUON. This working group, which may be tailored to handle specific materiel portfolios, will review the JUON in order to validate, reject, or request more information on behalf

<sup>40</sup> From Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), *Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs Brief for Business Managers*, Conference (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Acquisition University, 10 May 2005).

of the J8. Once a JUON is validated, the FCB will develop technical and resource options in support of the JUON.<sup>41</sup> The FCB may consist of the following members:

Requesting Combatant Commander

Services (As required)

Joint Staff

OSD(C)

OSD(PA&E)

Other COCOMs (As required)

ASD(NII)

JRAC

The J8, in conjunction with the FCB, has the authority to decline a JUON. This can lead to the JUON being directed back for a Service-specific acquisition or rejected with amplification. The option always remains open to the COCOM to resubmit rejected requests if new information becomes available or technology improves.<sup>42</sup>

Once a JUON is validated, the JRAC (in conjunction with the J8 DDRA) can further designate it as an Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN).<sup>43</sup> A JUON that is further designated an IWN requires a materiel solution in less than 120 days; this further designation confirms an added emphasis on the timely resolution of the urgent operational need and an enhanced visibility to OSD and the DepSecDef.<sup>44</sup> The limit for

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<sup>41</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>42</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, interview by author (Washington, DC), 7 September 2006.

<sup>43</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

validation or rejection of a submitted JUON as an IWN by the J8 and JRAC is 14 days from the date of submission, with a goal of 48 hours.<sup>45</sup>

The JRAC will then take the lead to track and facilitate a resolution for the IWN. It is important to note that although the JRAC assists and reviews all JUONs, it is specifically tailored and charged to be the single point of contact and accountability for tracking the timeliness and resolution of IWNs.<sup>46</sup>

This is where the process flow takes on an amorphous character. As mentioned earlier, the composition of advisory group members handling any one JUON/IWN is tailored specifically to the situation. Such is the case with the process flow. Figure 3 sketches a possible process flow in handling an IWN. Given the speed at which these needs are to be met, the process is “request-specific.” This requires the JRAC to be flexible and agile in its approach.

This flexible approach entails a multi-pronged method to engage key decision-makers from the areas that will ultimately provide the tools to facilitate the request. These areas include logistics, funding, and capabilities review and integration.

The logistics portion of any IWN is incorporated early on. The JRAC staff within USD (AT&L) contains a team member with extensive logistical credentials to address near- and long-term sustainability. At the inception of the JRAC, there was concern by DepSecDef Wolfowitz (also expressed by current DepSecDef England) to avoid “drive-by fielding” (i.e., fielding new equipment without adequate support) to insure that material equipment rapidly procured would not “die on the vine” once it reached the end-user. By including short- and long-term lifecycle solutions to accompany the rapid acquisition, the JRAC seeks to link the upkeep of a material solution to a procurement plan. The challenge is to avoid quick fixes that will soon be inoperable.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Robert Buhrkuhl, Power Point Presentation, *Overview for Joint Rapid Acquisition Workshop*, 20 June 2006.

<sup>46</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

<sup>47</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, interview by author (Washington, DC), 7 September 2006.

At the same time, the JRAC works along with the designated Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to refine the funding and material solutions with the requesting COCOM. The JRAC, with the J8 staff, will also place the materiel solutions priority and integration into the defense materiel portfolio and designate a service agency (DS/A) to monitor the procured system.

Any procurement that occurs through the efforts of the JRAC will have a designated Service that will contract, purchase, and maintain program oversight of the materiel. Early on, it is important to designate which Service will be taking over the long-term lifecycle management of any such rapid acquisition. By making sure a materiel solution is designated to a Service, the JRAC hopes to ensure a long-term caretaker for the materiel solution that will be incorporated into that Service's materiel portfolio and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. This does not necessarily mean that the initial funding will come from the designated Service's budget, but it may. Much of the funding for JRAC or IWN procurement has come from the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF).<sup>48</sup> The Service designated for management will be responsible for lifecycle costs once procurement has occurred. This coincides with the desire to insure that there is no "drive-by acquisition" that leaves a materiel solution fielded to the warfighter without Service program management designated for long-term oversight.


The JRAC, while working to designate a Service lead, also formulates strategy on how to fund the request. This is accomplished through close integration with the office of the USD Comptroller. The JRAC Deputy Director was specifically designated to be staffed from the office of the USD(C) to lend expertise in resolving funding issues quickly and appropriately within existing funding and budgetary regulations.

The goal was to incorporate comptroller expertise early on in the acquisition process to resolve any doubts and uncertainties concerning funding streams that could be utilized to resolve IWNs. Given that the JRAC office has no direct control over finances that can be utilized to procure IWN items, funding must be identified from available sources such as the IFF, the Services, or other DoD programs. The value of having a

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<sup>48</sup> Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF). Supplemental appropriations authorized by Congress for conducting ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terror.

direct link from USD(C) is to be able to see beyond one certain program or one Service's budget and reallocate resources as needed to fund the IWN.



**Figure 3. Possible Process Flow for Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell Resolution of Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN)**

This arrangement also clarifies the appropriateness of the use of funds. By having the comptroller's expertise in a proposed funding solution, there will be no doubt that the solution accords with regulations and law.

Simultaneously with logistics, Service designation, and funding, portfolio integration is addressed. Just because a COCOM has identified a potential materiel solution for a capability gap, there may be larger considerations (e.g., other equipment in use on the battlefield, new systems that will be deployed shortly, or solutions that may be in development that rival or even supersede the IWN solution proposed). The JRAC will work with the FCB to consider the integration of the IWN solution with other capabilities, whether current or future, in order to comply with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This is a decision-support system within the DoD designed to provide information necessary to build a well-balanced materiel portfolio and to avoid overlap within the Department.<sup>49</sup>

The JRAC and the FCB may work with the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) (part of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)) to analyze and prioritize JUONs and IWNs. This is yet another effort for the JRAC process to align with existing and future weapons and material portfolios across the Joint and Service portfolio spectrum.<sup>50</sup> The IWN solution is formulated to integrate the FCB, JRAC, and JCB—allowing a panoramic view across the DoD landscape to ensure there is not repetition of materiel solutions in other corners of the DoD or at the Service levels. This relationship also supports the “triage” efforts by the JRAC in the event of multiple JUON submissions that are similar in scope.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Lieutenant Commander Philip Walker, USN J8 Staff and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Butts USAF J8 Staff, interview by author (Washington, DC), 8 September 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).



## **1. Pulling the Trigger**

Once a solution has been derived, the JRAC may convene members from the JRAC core and advisory group (as necessary) to review the proposed solution. This allows pertinent members of the groups and departments to review and validate the solution as a whole package.

Once agreed upon, the solution may then be passed to the BOD (Budget Office Directors) Board if there are funding questions. The process may take on a more sequential path for final authorization and execution as it passes to the BOD. Alternatively, final funding approval may be as simplified in a concurrence memorandum authorizing funding if there are no questions. If necessary, the newly formed BOD adjudicates execution-year resourcing issues to fulfill an IWN. The BOD will take the JRAC package recommendation and will review the proposed solution to the IWN for proper budgetary authority. The JRAC (with BOD approval) will oversee reprogramming of funding as required to implement the IWN solution.<sup>52</sup>

The BOD may require the recommendation be sent back to the JRAC for a different funding solution that it will assist in devising (e.g., if IFF funds were going to be used, but legal ramifications do not allow funds to fulfill the IWN).

Once the recommended package is approved by the necessary departmental officers (including the DepSecDef), funding is reallocated within Services, across Services, shifted from one COCOM to another, or allocated from other sources such as the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF). Funds are then released to the designated Service lead, and procurement is initiated.

It is important to reiterate here that the processes mentioned above are all in motion simultaneously; they do not occur in sequential steps. This dynamic coincides with the nature of the acquisition and the timeliness it requires. Once a solution is formulated by the JRAC, there may be a more sequential process as it passes the final gates of the JRAC core, advisory board, and the BOD. Members of these boards, however, have been integrated into the final solution early on in the process and, thus, are

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<sup>52</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in The Year of Execution*, 15 July 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3470.01).

not seeing the solution as first-time observers. By integrating into one office (the JRAC) the ability to reach out to key individuals to gather information and make decisions quickly, much of the linearity of the “normal” acquisition process is condensed and occurs concurrently.

This makes the JRAC an expeditor within the DoD.<sup>53</sup> Just like many large organizations serving a wide and varied customer base, the DoD has initiated its own expedited process to handle those issues that need immediate attention. Large companies label and empower offices or groups of individuals as expeditors to solve those situations that require immediate resolution. In business, without immediate resolution to some situations, a client may be lost.

In the DoD, the cost to the organization may be in unacceptable losses of life or of mission success.

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<sup>53</sup> Mr. Tim Courington, Senior Program Analyst/Contractor Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, interview by author (Washington, DC), 7 September 2006.

### III. JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL CASELET

#### A. CC-0074

The purpose of this caselet is to review an actual request from a Combatant Command that was handled using the JRAC process. The request emanated from Central Command, which is currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. This investigation will follow the chain of events that led to the resolution of the identified capability gap. The review illustrates the implementation of the JRAC process in practice and the flexible approach inherent to the JRAC process in resolving requests.

On 14 February 2006, the Commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (CO MNF-I) located in Baghdad, endorsed a memorandum for a JUON (Joint Urgent Operational Need) to fill a perceived gap in capabilities.<sup>54</sup> Due to its classified nature, the materiel solution requested in this JUON, endorsed by Brigadier General Donald Campbell Jr., MNF-I Chief of Staff, will be termed Materiel X.

The endorsed memorandum was forwarded from MNF-I Headquarters to Central Command Headquarters (CENTCOM) in Florida for validation, endorsement, and forwarding. On 14 April 2006, 59 days later, the JUON was submitted electronically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 DDRA and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). The J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA) received the JUON, which included the description of the materiel requested, mission and threat analysis, non-materiel alternatives, potential materiel alternatives, potential resource tradeoffs, constraints and points of contact that had been compiled.<sup>55</sup> The JUON accompanied the endorsement memorandum for Materiel X signed by the Chief of Staff, Major General Lloyd Austin III, of CENTCOM.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Brigadier General Donald M. Campbell, Chief of Staff Multi-National Corps Iraq, *Memorandum, Subject: US Central Command (USCENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) for Materiel X Solution in Support of Combat Operations (U)*, 14 February 2006.

<sup>55</sup> Major General Lloyd Austin III, Chief of Staff United States Central Command, *Memorandum, Subject: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) Statement for Materiel X Solution (U)*, 14 April 2006.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

After the submission and review by the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board (BA FCB) of CC-0074 (the CENTCOM serial designator for this JUON), a brief was put together by Lieutenant Colonel Coyne. LtCol Coyne, who heads the BA FCB, outlined in the brief the board's review and recommendations for resolving CC-0074. The brief outlined the stated problems facing the warfighter, the capability gap, a proposed materiel solution, endorsement by the BA FCB as an immediate capability need, and a recommendation for \$6 million of funding.<sup>57</sup>

The originally submitted JUON from CENTCOM asked for 585 units of Materiel X in order to fill the capability gap. According to the briefing by LtCol Coyne, the BA FCB recommended that 150 units would be sufficient to fill the short-term need in the area of responsibility (AOR) which consists of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The CENTCOM submission did not include projected costs to fund the original request for 585 units.<sup>58</sup>

By 25 April 2006, the BA FCB finalized its validation of CC-0074 and its recommendations. The BA FCB recommendation was reviewed and approved by the JUON gatekeeper, Brigadier General Schmidle (J8 DDRA).

Brigadier General Schmidle, in a 28 April 2006 e-mail to Dr. R. Buhrkuhl (JRAC Director), outlined the Joint Staff's recommendations (which had been adopted from the BA FCB) pertaining to CC-0074. The recommendation validated CC-0074 as a necessary JUON and further recommended its designation as an Immediate Warfighter Need (IWN). Brigadier General Schmidle also specified a quantity of 150 units of Materiel X and a funding level of \$6 million to fill the request. There had been some discussion between the Joint Staff and CENTCOM representatives in revalidating the quantity prior to this e-mail. The J8 DDRA then asked the JRAC to coordinate as lead for fulfilling the IWN and to query the CENTCOM customer to again verify the quantity recommended in order for the JRAC to move forward.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Coyne, BA FCB Lead, *Brief: CENTCOM Request for Materiel X Solution JUON*, April 2006.

<sup>58</sup> Major General Lloyd Austin III, Chief of Staff United States Central Command, *Memorandum, Subject: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) Statement for Materiel X Solution (U)*, 14 April 2006.

<sup>59</sup> Brigadier General Robert Schmidle, Joint Chiefs of Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition, e-mail to Dr. R. Buhrkuhl, *Subject: CENTCOM JOUN for Materiel X*, 28 April 2006.

By 1 May 2006, Dr. Buhrkuhl was in contact with Major General Austin of CENTCOM via e-mail outlining the proposed course of action the JRAC was about to take in order to fulfill the IWN. This feedback to the customer included discussion of the 150 proposed units as a near-term solution, indicated that a board would be looking into a joint long-term solution to the capability gap, and that CC-0074 was now designated an IWN.<sup>60</sup>

As of 16 June 2006, there was uncertainty as to which organization would fund the IWN. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was indicating that it would not be able to fund the IWN (as previously hoped for) due to other obligations and constraints. By 16 July 2006, JIEDDO made the final decision to not fund the IWN; another course of action was necessary in order to fund and acquire the needed materiel.<sup>61</sup>

The JRAC pressed on to formulate a new funding solution in order to resolve CC-0074. On 8 August 2006, the JRAC convened to review CC-0074 and facilitate its resolution. A secure video teleconference (SVTC) was conducted that brought key decision-makers to the table in order to resolve the issue. Portions of the SVTC included a capability brief of Materiel X (given by Major Gary Jones from the office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Directorate of Information Dominance, Reconnaissance Systems Division (SAF/AQIJ)), future production schedules, and costs.<sup>62</sup> Discussion ensued between participating members which included the Joint Staff, OSD(C), CENTCOM, OSD(DT&E), OSD(NII), OSD(OUSDI), SAF/AQIJ, OSD(P&R), ASA(ACT), OSD(AT&L), and the JRAC.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, e-mail to Major General L. Austin, *Subject: CENTCOM JUON for Materiel X*, 1 May 2006.

<sup>61</sup> J8 Joint Urgent Operational Needs Tracking System, 6 October 2006.

<sup>62</sup> Major Gary Jones, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Directorate of Information Dominance, *Brief: Materiel X*, 8 August 2006.

<sup>63</sup> J8 Joint Urgent Operational Needs Tracking System, 6 October 2006.

Upon the completion of the SVTC, the participants indicated support for the proposed funding solution, CC-0074 designation as a necessary IWN, and the anticipated quantity to resolve the issue.<sup>64</sup>

The JRAC immediately followed up with an Action Memorandum, dated 8 August 2006, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval of funding to resolve the IWN. This Action Memorandum requested the transfer of \$6 million to the Air Force for acquisition of 150 units of Materiel X and designated the OSD(C) to provide notification to Congress five days prior to such transfer.<sup>65</sup>

Tab A of the memorandum reviewed previous discussions and decisions relating to the IWN up to that point.

Tab B was utilized for concurrence/non-concurrence signatures and comments by the following departments:

USD(C)	MARCORSYSCOM
JCS J8 DDRA	SAF/AQIJ
OGC	CTTF
USD(I)	DPAD
USD(P&R)	CENTCOM J8
ASD-NII <sup>66</sup>	

In conjunction with the action memorandum, Mr. Tim Courington of the JRAC staff also requested support from the relevant individuals and offices mentioned above via an e-mail on 8 August 2006. The e-mail on the IWN attached the action memorandum for funding transfer and summarized the earlier SVTC, questions that had arisen during discussion, and instructions pertaining to the action memorandum.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Mr. Tim Courington, JRAC, e-mail to Mr. Roberto Rodriguez OSD(C) et al., *Subject: Action Memo to DepSecDef: Using IFF to Fund CENTCOM IWN/JUON for Materiel X Capability*, 8 August 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Mr. Tim Courington, JRAC, e-mail to Mr. Roberto Rodriguez OSD(C) et al., *Subject: Action Memo to DepSecDef: Using IFF to Fund CENTCOM IWN/JUON for Materiel X Capability*, 8 August 2006.

<sup>66</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, *Action Memorandum, Subject: Approval of Funding Transfer to Expedite Resolution of CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) for Materiel X*, 8 August 2006.

<sup>67</sup> Mr. Tim Courington, JRAC, e-mail to Mr. Roberto Rodriguez OSD(C) et al., *Subject: Action Memo to DepSecDef: Using IFF to Fund CENTCOM IWN/JUON for Materiel X Capability*, 8 August 2006.

By 17 August 2006, SAF/AQIJ was providing feedback via e-mail to the JRAC office as to the funding and appropriation data required to contract for Materiel X.<sup>68</sup> As early as 9 August 2006, departments began to sign and comment on the action memorandum. The action memorandum, Tab B, was completed with all required signatures affixed on 31 August 2006.<sup>69</sup>

On 8 September 2006, Mr. Courington, in an e-mail to Mr. Rodney McMahon, notified the SAF/AQIJ office of final documentation required and that funding allocation and budgetary authority would be occurring the week of 11-15 September 2006 to allow contracting of Materiel X.<sup>70</sup>

Mr. Rodney McMahon contacted Mr. Courington via e-mail on 27 September 2006 to indicate that 165 units of Materiel X had been contracted.<sup>71</sup> Upon contract award, the Joint Staff J8 updated its JUON tracking system—indicating that the earliest delivery of Materiel X to CENTCOM would occur between January or February 2007 (earliest to latest possible dates), and that all units would be delivered by May 2007.<sup>72</sup>

## **B. CASELET SUMMARY**

The caselet provides an insight into the resolution of just one request handled by the JRAC. Many portions of the process proceeded as designed. From receipt of the request, the J8 and JRAC staffs immediately set about validating and working to find a solution to meet the warfighters' needs. Upon validation and designation as an IWN, the JRAC took the lead and sought approval and implementation of the solution.

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<sup>68</sup> SAF/AQIJ Workflow Notes. e-mail, *Subject: FW: Action Memo to DepSecDef: Using IFF to Fund CENTCOM IWN/JUON for Materiel X*, 17 August 2006.

<sup>69</sup> Dr. Robert Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, *Action Memorandum, Subject: Approval of Funding Transfer to Expedite Resolution of CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) for Materiel X*, 8 August 2006.

<sup>70</sup> Mr. Tim Courington, JRAC, e-mail, *Subject: RE: Materiel X CENTCOM JUON CC-0074*, 8 September 2006.


<sup>71</sup> Mr. Ricky McMahon, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Directorate of Information Dominance, e-mail to Mr. Tim Courington, JRAC, *Subj: CENTCOM JUON for Materiel X Update*, 27 September 2006.

<sup>72</sup> J8 Joint Urgent Operational Needs Tracking System, 6 October 2006.

As the lead Staff, the JRAC was free to consult key decision-makers and incorporate relevant departments as necessary. This flexibility to access departments throughout the DoD, industry, the Services, and the COCOMs, along with the urgency associated with the IWN request, granted the JRAC speed in resolving the issue. As stated, only those parties relevant to the process were incorporated when necessary to preserve the essence of speed. Once consensus had been reached, the JRAC moved to immediately implement the solution. Consultation with the COCOM, designation of a Service lead, logistical, and budgetary planning were incorporated as necessary.

Some aspects of this caselet depart from the JRAC process described above. For example, BOD involvement was unnecessary in this case. Therefore, the JRAC did not formally convene the Directors regarding this particular solution. This decision illustrates the flexibility of the JRAC process in eliminating unnecessary departments and personnel that may slow the process.





*Cycle-times— 443 Days: First Endorsement CC-0074 (CO MNF-I) to Final Delivery of Materiel X*

*—59 Days: CENTCOM Administrative Action CC-0074*

*—14 Days: Joint Staff J8 DDRA Administrative Action CC-0074*

*—125 Days: JRAC as Lead till Final Authorization to Resolve CC-0074*

*—27 Days: From Authorization to Contract Award*

*—95-126 Days: From Contract Award to Materiel X to Warfighter*

*—187-218 Days: From Contract Award to All Units—Materiel X to Warfighter*

**Figure 4. Joint Urgent Operational Need/Immediate Warfighter Need CC-0074 Timeline**


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## IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### A. JUON RESOURCING ACTIONS

The JRAC has facilitated and assisted in resolving numerous Immediate Warfighter Need and Joint Urgent Operational Need requests. Since the JRAC's inception and the use of JUONs by the COCOMs, requests have increased significantly.<sup>73</sup> Along with the increase in requests, the complexity and dollar amounts associated with JUONs and IWNs have increased.

There were three JUONs submitted to the J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA) in 2004. In 2005, 10 JUONs were submitted. As of October 2006, there have been 61 total JUON requests submitted. Figure 5 displays the increase in




**Figure 5. Number of Joint Urgent Operational Need Requests to the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (J8 DDRA) 2004-2005<sup>74</sup>**

<sup>73</sup> Lieutenant Commander Philip Walker, USN J8 Staff and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Butts USAF J8 Staff, interview by author (Washington, DC), 8 September 2006.

<sup>74</sup> Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA), *Joint Urgent Operational Need Tracker*, 11 October 2006.

JUON requests. There was a 510% increase from 2005 to 2006.<sup>75</sup> The increase in workload was handled by one Joint Staff officer as a collateral duty and by the JRAC office that has a permanent staff of six.<sup>76</sup>

JUONs are now being submitted for larger capital items such as vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles, which has increased the dollar amounts associated with many of the requests. Figure 6 shows the increase in dollar amounts approved for JOUN funding. The average amount for each approved JUON is just over \$10 million. The percentage change in funding from 2005 to 2006 was 883%.



**Figure 6. Approved Joint Urgent Operational Need Funding 2004-2006<sup>77</sup>**


The largest user of the JUON process is CENTCOM. With 66 of the 74 submitted JUONs, CENTCOM accounts for 89% of all requests. SOCOM and NORTHCOM JUONs each account for 3% of the requests. Given current circumstances

<sup>75</sup> Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA), *Joint Urgent Operational Need Tracker*, 11 October 2006.

<sup>76</sup> Lieutenant Commander Philip Walker, USN J8 Staff and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Butts USAF J8 Staff, interview by author (Washington, DC), 8 September 2006.

<sup>77</sup> Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA), *Joint Urgent Operational Need Tracker*, 11 October 2006.

in Iraq and Afghanistan, such numbers are not surprising considering that CENTCOM's AOR includes both countries. Figure 7 presents the number of JUON requests by command.




**Figure 7. Submitted Joint Urgent Operational Needs by Command 2004-2006<sup>78</sup>**

### C. IWN RESOURCING ACTIONS

The designation of JUONs as Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs) has also increased. There were no IWN designations in 2004, with one designation in 2005. There have been 18 IWNs thus far for 2006. Figure 8 indicates the percentage of JUONs designated as IWNs and the increased instance of this designation over time. There have been a total of 19 IWNs from 2004 to 2006—making up 25% of all JUONs submitted. Of interest is the 1700% increase in designations of IWNs from 2005 to 2006. The trend in both submissions of JUONs and subsequent designation as an IWN indicates that the

<sup>78</sup> Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA), *Joint Urgent Operational Need Tracker*, 11 October 2006.

COCOMs (especially CENTCOM) are increasing their use of the JUON process; likewise, clearly a greater percentage of JUONs are becoming IWNs.




**Figure 8. Approved Joint Urgent Operational Need Funding 2004-2006<sup>79</sup>**

The capabilities requested are also worth noting. Of the IWN capabilities funded through JRAC actions, Figure 9 exhibits the amount of money spent per category and its percentage of total funded actions from 2004 to 2006.

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
<sup>79</sup> Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Resources & Acquisition (DDRA), *Joint Urgent Operational Need Tracker*, 11 October 2006.



**Figure 9. JRAC-funded Actions by Capability 2004-2006<sup>80</sup>**

A total of \$239.9 million has been funded to resolve JRAC actions to date. The vast majority of funding for the resolution of IWNs handled by the JRAC has come from the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF). Figure 10 shows the amount and funding source for actions as of September 2006.

<sup>80</sup> Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, *Resourcing Actions*, 7 September 2006.




**Figure 10. JRAC Funding Sources 2004-2006<sup>81</sup>**

The average cost has been \$15.99 million per IWN handled by the JRAC with a standard error of \$4.58 million. The minimum is \$1.5 million, maximum of \$67.2 million, for a range of \$65.7 million to date. The data indicates that IWNs handled by the JRAC are not exceeding the \$100 million mark. Figure 11 shows a histogram of actions funded by the JRAC from 2004 to 2006. This data reveals that the majority of actions are below \$15 million. There is another \$24.5 million in proposed actions (IFF and Non-IFF funds) that the JRAC is currently working to resolve as of this writing.


<sup>81</sup> Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, *Resourcing Actions*, 7 September 2006.





**Figure 11. Histogram of JRAC-funded Actions 2004-2006<sup>82</sup>**

Figure 12 shows the trend over time of JRAC actions that have been funded. There was an increase in dollars for JRAC-funded actions of 750% from 2004-2005 and 168% from 2005 to 2006. The data also points to the fact that as time goes on and the JUON/TWN process becomes better known and utilized, the amount of actions funded will increase.



**Figure 12. JRAC-funded Actions 2004-2006<sup>83</sup>**

<sup>82</sup> Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, *Resourcing Actions*, 7 September 2006.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

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## **V. VALUE ANALYSIS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter uses the concept of value centers from Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory to assess the value of JRAC.<sup>84</sup> In KVA methodology, value centers are defined to highlight steps in organizational processes that both add value to the final product as well as those that waste resources. Here, they will be used as a means for judging the value added by JRAC over existing rapid acquisition processes.

### **B. VALUE CENTERS**

This section presents ten value centers that were chosen because of their importance to rapid acquisition and the possibility that they could influence the acquisition community at large. Without these centers, rapid initiatives such as the JRAC would not be successful in meeting the warfighters' immediate needs. Once added to the existing acquisition communities' body of knowledge, these value centers will help to achieve a faster and more customer- friendly rapid acquisition solution.

The first four value centers focus on measures to rapidly move a request from the warfighter through the acquisition process. This expediting is valuable because speed is essential in providing a solution, and those steps from the JRAC process that distinguish themselves from existing rapid or normal acquisition processes are worth noting. Value centers five through nine are noteworthy because they represent how the JRAC's distinctive methods add to the existing acquisition structure; they show how rapid solutions and best practices from the JRAC: fit into the larger acquisition strategy, more efficiently utilize resources, improve communication with the customer, and can translate into improved rapid acquisition and, possibly, normal acquisition practices. Finally, value center ten illustrates how the JRAC is better suited for the future of war than other processes have been and is valuable to the DoD because it provides insight into how the

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<sup>84</sup> Thomas J. Housel and Arthur H. Bell, *Measuring and Managing Knowledge* (Boston, Mass.:McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001).

acquisition processes of the future will need to align and equip the warfighter given the increasing speed and evolutionary nature of war.

## **1. Value Center One: Speed**

Speed has been incorporated into all the rapid acquisition processes in the research, but it is impossible to gauge to what level. The Service processes all stress speed, but only the Army REF program has a quantifiable reference to speed. The Army REF has a goal of 90 days to find a solution and a goal of 360 days to field that solution to the warfighter. The other Service processes all stress speed and timely resolution, but there is little reference to exact time limits or to possible ramifications if they are not met.

The JRAC process, on the other hand, establishes a limit of 14 days to validate a JUON and designate it an IWN if necessary, with a goal of 48 hours. The process also states a goal of developing a solution within 120 days. There is no reference, however, to a goal or timeline for fielding of a solution to the warfighter.

It is valuable to the DoD that JRAC is establishing goals that incorporate speed and timeliness in validation and resolution of an immediate request, but more can be done in this area. Deadlines and hard time limits may not be the answer, but some measure of time should be established to provide an incentive to more quickly field the solution to the warfighter. A developed solution that has all the approval and funding is only valuable when the warfighter is able to use the product. Setting a time goal for validation, resolution, and fielding should be established, or the customer and the people working the process will have no clear gauge of speed. Without established fielding goals, this process may become a non-value added approach.

## **2. Value Center Two: Budgetary Options**

Access to capital is an important facet for any business to quickly deal with deficiencies and opportunities it sees in the market place. The same can be said for the DoD and the Services. The rapid acquisition processes, whether at the DoD level or the Service level, are an attempt to quickly fill an identified capability gap. In order to fill that gap, resources such as money are required. At the Service level, the ability to

provide the capital to resolve an urgent need is available; but, in most cases, this funding only extends as far as the Service level. The Service certainly can attempt other avenues to procure funding, but once the process is outside of its controlled capital, the Service will have to seek authorities outside of its control. This may lead to a slow down in a rapid acquisition process.

This is a value-added benefit of the JRAC process. The JRAC, which is located at the USD level, has access to funding across the entire spectrum of the DoD. It is not limited to Service-specific funds, but can cross all aspects of DoD funding streams to find a funding solution. This flexibility in funding avenues is beneficial to the DoD and allows the process to more rapidly be resolved.

### **3. Value Center Three: Elevated and Streamlined Bureaucracy**

At the Service level, there is a bureaucracy that is inherent in any large organization. The same is true at the DoD level. And, as with any bureaucracy, such red tape can slow down any attempt at speed to resolve a situation. The Service processes did indicate that the highest levels within their respective acquisition communities would be involved in resolving rapid acquisition issues; but, no research was done to see if such involvement has reduced bureaucracy as a factor.

The JRAC process has brought value to the DoD acquisition level by elevating and streamlining the manner in which it handles urgent requests from the warfighter. By placing the JRAC at the USD level within the DoD, lower levels of bureaucracy which would slow the process can be eliminated. The access and authorities inherent within the JRAC office (and its direct link to the USD(AT&L) and the DepSecDef) add needed emphasis required to speed the request through the bureaucracy. This authority has also allowed the JRAC to move to the front of the line to access decision-makers who can authorize final decisions rapidly and not merely work the request through the system.

There is a non-value added possibility also given the level at which the JRAC operates. The threat may arise that because lower levels of bureaucracy have been detoured, solutions are now being scrutinized by powerful personalities. These

individuals (due to their status or political position) may have authority to stall or prohibit the completion of a request. There is no concrete data to support this, but it may be a possible area for consideration.

#### **4. Value Center Four: Focus**

The Service level initiatives at rapid acquisition are embedded within acquisition staffs. The one exception is the Army REF that, while working within its acquisition framework, is a separate entity unto itself. This means that at the other Services and at USSCOM, the staffs handling rapid acquisition requests are made up of personnel that are handling other normal acquisition duties or have been pulled off of such duties to handle the rapid requests.

JRAC provides a value-added framework given its structure and focus. The JRAC office is staffed modestly with 6 personnel with high levels of acquisition experience and a broad array of talents in areas such as logistics, budgetary regulations, testing, and institutional knowledge. More importantly, the JRAC office and its process are focused on one task only: to rapidly resolve requests from the warfighter.

#### **5. Value Center Five: Wider Portfolio Balance**

The Services are charged with training and equipping the forces, and they do this in the context of their functional specialty. For example, the Air Force has its air-superiority capability and the Navy its maritime dominance. This equipping mission means that the Service builds a portfolio of systems that it requires to meet its functional specialty. The Service rapid acquisition processes do the same within the scope of that specialty but are only interested in resolving those requests that will affect the Service's mission.

The JRAC adds value by being able to look beyond just one specific Service and its specialty. The JRAC is resolving requests that are joint in nature and may overlap several Services. With the JRAC's ability to examine all Service and department portfolios, there is a possibility of reducing unneeded repetition or overlap and of even providing economies of scale. The hope is that a request for a solution may not just be

useful in one COCOM or Service but may be applied across the spectrum. Another benefit of a broader portfolio vantage point is that the solution may already exist at the Service level and not be known to the COCOM; JRAC could utilize such solutions immediately.

## **6. Value Center Six: Alignment with Acquisition Strategy**

The Services build their system portfolios based on their specific charge—a bottom-up process. The Service acquisition and rapid acquisition teams build this portfolio; then it funnels up and is gathered at the DoD level. It is this system that the DoD is determined to change. JCIDS is reworking the process to be more top-down in nature. There is a greater emphasis to not work within a vacuum at the Service level nor build a portfolio just to meet the Service-specific mission, but to create a portfolio that can be integrated in a joint environment.

The JRAC adds value because it aligns with this philosophy. Its location at the USD level allows it to see beyond each Service and examine requests to see how they will integrate into the larger joint picture and even into conjunction with our allies. If greater portfolio balance is to be achieved, and a top-down acquisition process is the DoD's goal, then the JRAC process is valuable for a rapid acquisition framework.

## **7. Value Center Seven: Impartiality**

At the Service level, there exists a possibility that certain programs could gain advocates regardless of larger ramifications or true worth. Yet, at the rapid acquisition level, one Service's "necessary item" may have implications outside of that Service in the joint structure or allied arena.

The JRAC provides a degree of separation in approaching a solution. In the JRAC process, the funding follows the solution to the designated Service lead. It focuses on the solution, not necessarily a product. Since the JRAC is neither gaining nor losing funds for a solution, it is acting as a facilitator—removing the possibility that a solution is

motivated by control of funding or a bigger piece of the budget. The downside is that because each solution is turned over for Service lead, long-term vigilance of the solution and its funding may be overlooked.

## **8. Value Center Eight: Lifecycle Costs**

One area that came up repeatedly in the research is the long-term sustainability and lifecycle costs of rapidly fielded solutions from the Service and JRAC processes. The Services are in the trenches formulating their portfolios, fielding their solutions and funding the capabilities long-term—providing training and life-cycle maintenance funding. The Services' rapid acquisition teams, which are drawn from their internal acquisition community, may be more familiar with this sort of long-term planning.

This is an area in which the JRAC process may not be adding value to the DoD acquisition process. The JRAC facilitates the solution to an urgent request, and then passes that program onto a Service lead for long-term management. Although the Service lead is incorporated and helps frame the solution early on, it is not clear yet if the true lifecycle costs are being calculated any better by the JRAC than in Service rapid acquisition initiatives. More research is necessary to determine if the Services are being assigned management of a JRAC product that is not resourced properly for the long-term.

## **9. Value Center Nine: Feedback**

There seems to be no clear feedback mechanism at either the Service or JRAC rapid acquisition level from the customer. The perception exists that the Service processes may have a better feedback mechanism given the internal flow of information from their internal units and their smaller structure, but this has not been validated.

Yet, for the JRAC, this is an area of non-value added capability that needs to be addressed in order to determine if the JRAC is meaningful to DoD acquisition. The warfighter customer must find the solution useful and effective, or it is worthless no matter how fast it arrived. Clearly, there must be a manner in which to capture that information. The JRAC is fielding solutions quickly and in a streamlined manner; but without acknowledgement from the warfighter, there can be no way to gauge if more



speed is necessary, if other safeguards need to be implemented, or if more resources should be diverted to this area. The Army REF program seems to have a good feedback mechanism: it incorporates its REF personnel with the warfighter to get a real-time sense of a solution's effectiveness. Obviously, this may not be a viable option for the JRAC process. But, questions that the JRAC team should be asking might include:

- Is the materiel useful now that you have it, and is it doing what you wanted?
- Did it get to you soon enough?
- Has it saved lives or led to mission accomplishment?
- How were lives lost or did missions fail before you had it?
- Is it safe? Does it have negative or unintended consequences, and/or could it be better?

Just how the answers to these questions are best garnered, however, remains unknown and an option for further research.

## **10. Value Center Ten: Evolving Nature of War**

The Services and the DoD have been training their warfighters to be flexible, agile, and to cycle through the OODA Loop faster than the enemy. This is the basis for maneuver warfare. The acquisition communities that equip the warfighter should be doing the same in order to truly align with the operational side of the DoD. As war evolves, so must the manner in which we fight it.<sup>85</sup> The manner in which we resource and equip the warfighter must also evolve with time. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, speed and flexibility will prove crucial in maintaining military dominance over our enemies. The acquisition process should complement the DoD's ability to be fast and agile on the battlefield, not be a hindrance.

The JRAC process provides a value-added benefit to the DoD acquisition process by proving that a faster process can work. The Services are rapidly equipping warfighters at their level, but they may not circulate their solutions and lessons learned

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<sup>85</sup> Colonel Thomas H. Hammes, USMC, *The Sling and the Stone On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (St. Paul, MN, Zenith Press, 2004)

throughout the organization. The JRAC provides a test bed for such flexibility. It provides a model with which to gain knowledge and best practices and a real-time fielding for the rapid acquisition process, not just a theory for it. At this level, best practices can be disseminated across the DoD and to acquisition training facilities such as the Defense Acquisition University and Service Top Level Schools. In this way, the JRAC can help instruct future acquisition professionals about the importance of speed in acquisition. For time truly can save money and lives.

## **C. SUMMARY**

These value centers signify areas that add to the DoD acquisition process and the existing Service processes. There are positive and some possible negative impacts of the JRAC process as identified above; but, by identifying these areas, acquisition staffs can implement and build upon those facets that facilitate rapid distribution of solutions to the warfighter and refine those areas that may hinder mission success.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this research has been both to investigate whether the JRAC and its processes are value added to the DoD acquisition process, as well as to document the process and its usage up to now.

The research described the JRAC process through document review, interviews with JRAC and ancillary personnel, and historical examination. The caselet provided insight into the actual workings of the JRAC process and utilized historical records, correspondence, and a timeline to assist in documenting the process. Finally, implementation of the JRAC process was quantified using statistical analysis of records.

The research, along with the value centers (outlined in Appendix I), indicates that the JRAC is a value-added process and should be institutionalized, but with great caution.

As with many small endeavors, as the JRAC's size grows and its roots grow deeper with time, great care must be taken to not lose its core functions and its agility and flexibility. The mere use of "institutionalization" to signify the JRAC's long-term inclusion in DoD acquisition may connote bureaucracy and red tape. This would be exactly the opposite of the desired outcome.

According to Dr. Buhrkuhl, JRAC Director, the JRAC requires three facets: It must have flexibility in its processes to rapidly handle requests; it needs a senior-level and knowledgeable acquisition team, and it needs the clout and cover of a high-level office to support its endeavors.<sup>86</sup> With institutionalization of the Cell, caution will have to be taken to ensure that these requirements are not superseded by cumbersome procedures and intrusion by other departments.

The need to institutionalize, however, outweighs negatives due to the current situation. There is a possibility that with a reduction or cessation of US presence in Iraq and/or drying up of Congressional supplemental funding, the need for the JRAC could be perceived as unnecessary. Unfortunately, the exact opposite is true. To say that rapid acquisition is only a war-time tool is to miss an opportunity. This process and capability cannot be grown overnight. It is evident from the JRAC inception timeline that to even

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<sup>86</sup> Dr. R. Buhrkuhl, Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Video Teleconference, 1 August 2006.

get authorities, personnel, and functions in place requires too much time in this era. It took eleven months for the Joint Staff to put together an instruction on how to process IWN requests. That is not to say they were slow; the implementation process simply takes time. But the DoD should not lose the institutional knowledge and the other value-added benefits of the JRAC by allowing it to slowly fade away. This knowledge is invaluable and provides a foundation for the next war or crisis; it may even provide an actual paradigm to be applied to other DoD acquisition processes. The value placed on institutional knowledge should be considered.<sup>87</sup>

There is validation by the COCOMs that the JRAC process is valuable. The increased employment of the process and the COCOM's gratitude when submitted requests are designated IWNs indicates that they find the process to be value added.<sup>88</sup> The repeat business from the customer indicates there is a level of satisfaction with both the service provided and the materiel acquired through the JRAC. The ability to provide a service or materiel in a timely manner to the warfighter has many benefits—one of which is in restoring faith in what many consider an extremely slow acquisition process. Further research needs to be conducted, though, as to the correlation between usage of the JRAC process and access to supplemental funding such as the IFF. Lack of supplemental funding may affect the usage rate of the JRAC process by the COCOMs and, therefore, may indicate whether the JRAC is dependent on supplemental funding and only useful during urgent times of war.

The JRAC model also fits more closely with the top-down strategy being implemented currently within DoD. The tradition of the Services being completely responsible for equipping and training the forces may be changing given the increasingly joint nature of the DoD. Just as the JRAC process is charged with filling capability gaps on the battlefield, rapid acquisition processes are filling gaps in the normal DoD acquisition process. The evolutionary nature of war and changes in technology will

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<sup>87</sup> Jack D. Patterson, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), interview by author (Washington, DC), 8 September 2006.

<sup>88</sup> Major General Lloyd Austin III, United States Central Command, Chief of Staff, *Memorandum of appreciation for support as an IWN to JRAC Director, Subject: United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) Statement for Materiel X Solution (U)*, 10 May 2006.

require the DoD acquisition process to speed up. The day of opposing one superpower nation state under centralized control is over for now; therefore, decision processes that took inordinate amounts of time can no longer be applied. A world with several emerging nation-state threats, along with the numerous non-nation-state threats that make radical decisions hourly, make it necessary for the DoD acquisition system to fundamentally change. The JRAC process may be a good place to start.

In the course of compiling this project, the author identified some areas that warrant further research. One area deals with funding sources and its implications on rapid acquisition initiatives. The JRAC is capable of utilizing numerous funding sources, but the research has shown that the Iraqi Freedom Fund has been a dominant supplier of money in resolving requests. More research should be done to determine how rapid acquisition initiatives will be funded in the future with normal budgetary cycles. The reality that supplemental defense spending will not go on indefinitely dictates the future utilization of the JRAC process will depend on other sources of funding; this may affect the speed at which requests from the warfighter can be resolved. It is yet to be determined if the JRAC is dependent on the IFF, and if the JRAC process can be utilized once such funding is gone.

Another area for follow-on research is an investigation into the Services' role as the long-term managers of rapid acquisition materiel. The materiel procured through the JRAC process is relatively new and is being managed by the designated Service lead. As time goes by, research will be necessary to examine how well the Services are managing these systems and how they are fitting into the Service and the DoD materiel portfolio. Further research in this area could also identify whether rapid acquisitions have been beneficial to the warfighters in the long-term, not just in meeting their immediate needs.

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## APPENDIX

<u>Value Centers</u>	<u>Baseline</u>	<u>JRAC</u>	<u>Value Added (VA)</u> <u>and/or</u> <u>Non-Value Added (NVA)</u>
<b>Speed</b>	<i>Speed and rapid resolution stressed but limited hard timelines, metrics, or defined repercussions.</i>	<i>JRAC sets limit of 14 days to validate a JUON as an IWN (goal of 48hrs; ,limit of 120 days to formulate a solution. No set limit for fielding to customer or defined ramifications.</i>	<i>VA—JRAC has set deadlines for validation and solution.</i>  <i>Non-VA—No limit or goal set for fielding solution to consumer, nor penalties for not meeting limits or goals.</i>
<b>Budgetary Options</b>	<i>Service-specific and limited to shifting resources within their power or sought externally, but may slow process.</i>	<i>DoD-wide Resourcing options. Can be delegated to service, drawn from other departments, or supplemental funds, i.e., IFF.</i>	<i>VA—Access to a greater pool of funds to draw from, which helps to speed up the process.</i>
<b>Bureaucracy</b>	<i>Services navigate internal bureaucracy for approval, not clear at what level. If funding required outside of Service, may involve DoD-wide bureaucracy and could slow down the process.</i>	<i>DoD-wide, involving USD-level departments. Different level of bureaucracy at DepSecDef &amp; USD level. Can be a plus or minus.</i>	<i>VA—Solution is handled by senior-level officials with decision-making authority and not subject to lower-level input (which could cause delay). Higher profile and access removes levels of bureaucracy.</i>  <i>Non-VA—Level of seniority involved could permanently slow process if inclined. No data to support this as yet.</i>
<b>Portfolio Balance</b>	<i>Service-specific and limited in scope to what is required to meet the Service-specific</i>	<i>Wider scope that can look across all of the DoD.</i>	<i>VA—Repetition can be reduced to avoid overlap between Services. JRAC request can be utilized</i>

	<i>mission.</i>		<i>DoD-wide, is more joint in nature, and may produce economies of scale.</i>
<b><u>Value Centers</u></b>	<b><u>Baseline</u></b>	<b><u>JRAC</u></b>	<b><u>Value Added (VA)</u> <u>and/or</u> <u>Non-Value Added (NVA)</u></b>
<b>Acquisition Strategy</b>	<i>Services build portfolios based on their specific mission; rapid acquisition processes add to that portfolio.</i>	<i>JRAC looks across all Service missions and examines rapid acquisition from a top-down, joint-nature perspective.</i>	<i>VA—Aligns more closely with initiatives such as JCIDS and COTS for a top-down acquisition strategy(if that is the direction that the DoD wants to pursue).</i>
<b>Impartiality</b>	<i>Service solutions and materiel may gain advocates regardless of wider DoD implications.</i>	<i>JRAC does not initiate a proposed materiel solution but attempts to facilitate a rapid acquisition. This decreases advocacy of a certain product while increasing advocacy for a solution. With no access to funding, there is limited perception about true use of funding.</i>	<i>VA—Funds follow the solution, are not transferred to JRAC, and not viewed as Service-centric in nature.</i>  <i>Non-VA—Each program then turned over to a Service for management; Service may ostracize a program for which it was never an advocate.</i>
<b>Lifecycle Costs</b>	<i>Services may be more proficient at gauging and preparing for total lifecycle costs associated with a rapid acquisition, therefore resourcing more appropriately.</i>	<i>JRAC rapidly finds solution and turns it over to a Service lead for lifecycle management.</i>	<i>Non-VA—Service lead may take management of a product that was not thoroughly analyzed for long-term maintenance, training, and resourcing.</i>
<b>Focus</b>	<i>Rapid Requests handled as additional duty from existing Service staffs engaged in POM and PPBES functions.</i>	<i>JRAC solely focused on rapid acquisition (JUON/IWN) requests.</i>	<i>VA—JRAC staff and process not assigned task as a secondary duty; solely focused on rapid acquisition requests.</i>



<b><u>Value Centers</u></b>	<b><u>Baseline</u></b>	<b><u>JRAC</u></b>	<b><u>Value Added (VA)</u> <b><u>and/or</u></b> <b><u>Non-Value Added (NVA)</u></b></b>
<b>Feedback</b>	<i>Services may have a better feedback mechanism and pulse on products: how they are actually working, and if the rapid process met the warfighters' needs given proximity of acquisition personnel to the warfighter.</i>	<i>JRAC has limited feedback, only from COCOM/ headquarters level and none currently from the warfighter.</i>	<i><b>Non-VA</b>—No feedback from the warfighter: if the product is getting to the field fast enough, if it is a benefit once it arrives, or if there are other ramifications. Separation of JRAC at top level of the DoD may hamper feedback from the warfighter.</i>
<b>Evolving Nature of War</b>	<i>Services have trained warfighters and future acquisition service personnel with speed and flexibility mindset. Unable to determine if such a mindset yields a better rapid acquisition product.</i>	<i>Speed, agility, flexibility in JRAC process located at the DoD and USD acquisition level aligns with how the DoD is training the warfighter and stresses these characteristics at the top of the organization.</i>	<i><b>VA</b>—Brings a new mentality to acquisition at the top levels of the DoD, not just at the Service levels. Shows that DoD acquisition can provide quality product to the field quickly—not just study or discuss it.</i>

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